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Limiting Equality: The Divergence and
Convergence of Title VII and Equal
Protection
Cheryl L Harrist

INTRODUCTION
Both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act proscribe
discrimination
and
authorize
remedies
to
address
discrimination-related inequality. Yet, constitutional and
statutory anti-discrimination protections have been interpreted
to differ, both with regard to the conduct or conditions that
constitute discrimination as well as the scope of permissible
remedies. As one illustration, consider the distinction between
Title VII and equal protection that the Court has drawn with
respect to disparate impact. Griggs v Duke Power Col
interpreted Title VII to proscribe an employer's selection
practices that produce disparate impact unless those procedures
are necessary or job related. Five years later in Washington u
Davis, 2 black applicants challenged a police department's use of
a general civil service test-Test 21-that disproportionately
excluded them as an equal protection violation on the
assumption that the constitutional definition of unlawful
discrimination was coextensive with the Title VII standard
under Griggs.3

t Rosalinde and Arthur Gilbert Professor in Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, UCLA
Law School. My thanks to the journal editors for their assistance and to the expert
research staff at UCLA Law Library.
1 401 US 424 (1971).
2 426 US 229
(1976).
Brief for Respondent, Washington v Davis, No 74-1492, *15 (US filed Dec 19,
1975) (available on Westlaw at 1975 WL 173558) ("Both the professional literature and
the legal requirements first articulated by this Court in Griggs . . . and developed in an
impressive array of lower court decisions, reject the notion that the use of a test can be
sustained, in the face of substantial adverse impact, on the basis of speculation as to its
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That assumption proved incorrect: the Court declined to
adjudicate equal protection claims in accordance with the
statutory standard, although lower courts had uniformly done
so. Citing concerns that Griggs imposed a too onerous burden of
proof on the state to justify government operations that
routinely produced racially disparate impact, the Court
predicted that the test would call for extensive judicial
intervention even absent intentional conduct, and would
undermine the Court's authority and legitimacy.4 Of course, the
Court's anxiety about its institutional limits was not its only
concern. The majority was also skeptical that racial disparities
were a sufficiently strong signal of racial discrimination to
warrant judicial correction. 5 As a consequence, the Court held
that Title VII and equal protection standards necessarily
diverged.6
Now the question presented by Davis-whether the
disparate impact standard is constitutionally required-has
shifted to whether the disparate impact claim is inconsistent
with equal protection guarantees. This issue was made salient
in Ricci v DeStefano,7 even though the Court as a whole did not
specifically address whether the disparate impact cause of
action per se offends the constitution. In that case, promotions to
supervisory positions on the New Haven Fire Department were
halted when the City determined that its assessment procedures
had excluded virtually all black and Latino candidates and that,
as a consequence, it risked being held liable for disparate impact
discrimination.8 A group of white firefighters challenged the

validity.").
4 Davis, 426 US at 240-248. On an alternate view, the fact that these procedures
produced racially disparate results arguably signaled that racial discrimination was
systemic rather than episodic, and thus required a doctrinal structure that did not
accept inequality as the status quo. Instead, the framework adopted by the Court in
Davis was bound to skew against remediation. See generally, for example, Barbara J.
Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of
DiscriminatoryIntent, 91 Mich L Rev 953 (1993); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan L Rev 317
(1987) (explaining how the intent standard has turned out to bar minorities' claims of
discrimination).
Davis, 426 US at 239 ("[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law
or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory
purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.").
6 Id at 247-48.
7

557 US 557 (2009).

8

Id at 565-68.
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City's decision to cancel the test results and craft new
evaluation methods as racially disparate treatment and asserted
they would have been promoted under the initial procedures.
While the majority did not join Scalia in openly speculating on
the constitutionality of Title VII's disparate impact provisions, 9
the Court asserted that disparate impact and disparate
treatment-the two statutory proof structures-were in
conflict.10 To resolve this perceived tension, the majority
borrowed a more stringent proof standard from equal protection
doctrine-whether the employer had a "strong basis in evidence"
that it would be liable for a disparate impact violation under
Title VII-as a predicate for taking action." Effectively, the
Court interpreted the statute to conform to the constitutional
standard, pushing equal protection and Title VII towards
convergence.
Given shifts in the Court personnel over time, and the
contentious nature of anti-discrimination law and politics,
perhaps it is unsurprising that the Court and individual justices
have endorsed differing views of the relationship between the
statutory and constitutional standards in evaluating racial
discrimination and its remediation. Indeed, the Court's
comparison of Title VII and equal protection has not produced
well-defined principles regarding this relationship. Claims that
the standards differ as well as the opposing view that they are
the same have rested on policy preferences, consequentialist
arguments, and normative concerns, but often the Court has
simply declared rather than analytically defended its position.
At times, as in Davis, the Court's position has been explicitly
stated; at other times, as in Ricci, the Court's view is implied as

9 Id at 594 (Scalia concurring) ("The difficulty is this: Whether or not Title VII's
disparate-treatment provisions forbid 'remedial' race-based actions when a disparateimpact violation would not otherwise result-the question resolved by the Court todayit is clear that Title VII not only permits but affirmatively requires such actions when a
disparate-impact violation would otherwise result. But if the Federal Government is
prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, then surely it is also prohibited from
enacting laws mandating that third parties-e.g., employers, whether private, State, or
municipal-discriminate on the basis of race. As the facts of these cases illustrate, Title
VII's disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring
employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based
on (because of) those racial outcomes. That type of racial decisionmaking is, as the Court
explains, discriminatory.") (citations omitted).
10 Id at 579-80.
" Ricci, 557 US at 582-84.
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doctrinal features are transplanted between constitutional and
statutory domains.
Beyond the competing arguments, a closer examination of
the logic, consequences, and political context of the Court's
comparative analysis of Title VII and constitutional standards
yields several insights. First, notwithstanding the prevailing
view that Title VII and equal protection standards for
establishing discrimination and assessing remedies are distinct,
there is a good deal of transference between them. Second, while
the Court has advanced various reasons why the standards are
similar or different, these competing views have come to cohere
in endorsing interpretations that have weakened antidiscrimination protection for non-whites, while enabling whites'
challenges to those same remedial measures. The Court's
comparative reasoning often is not racially neutral: The
interplay between Title VII and equal protection has functioned
asymmetrically to (re)produce an unequal doctrinal terrain.
Third, these doctrinal constraints reflect and legitimate the
period's contested racial politics, which endorsed only a limited
version of racial reform.
In Part I, I examine the claim that the standards for
defining discrimination and the scope of permissible remedies
under Title VII and equal protection are the same. Sometimes
this equivalence has been invoked in the context of broadening
the basis for remedying racial inequality, but often the
comparison has yielded a more narrow conception of racial
discrimination that renders legal remedies less available to nonwhites. Part II considers the claim that the statutory and
constitutional standards differ, focusing particularly on
disparate impact and affirmative action case law. The prevailing
view is that the equal protection standard is more restrictive
than Title VII. 12 In part, this reflects the consolidation of a
majority opinion that strict scrutiny is the appropriate equal
protection framework applicable to race-conscious affirmative
action. 13 What is less clear is why, as a consequence of
normative considerations, equal protection standards should
impose greater barriers than the statute to those seeking

12

See Part II.

s See Adarand Constructors, Inc u Pena, 515 US 200, 222 (1995) (holding that
strict scrutiny is the standard of review applicable to all race conscious affirmative
action).
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remedial relief from discrimination. Part III proceeds from the
observation that the distinction between Title VII and equal
protection standards is unstable and porous, as over time
aspects of equal protection analysis have been imported into the
Title VII cases and vice versa. In some instances, the standards
operationally became more similar even as they formally
differed. Nevertheless, the overall effect of this transference is to
contain the concept of racial discrimination and to limit the
range of permissible remediation in claims brought by racial
minorities. The convergence and divergence of Title VII and
equal protection has functioned as a technology of racial
retrenchment. 14
I. TITLE VII AND EQUAL PROTECTION CONVERGE

The view that Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause
define discrimination and remediation in similar terms has been
expressed in legal scholarship, in case law, and in the legislative
history of the statute. Indeed, fundamental to the claim that the
statutory and constitutional standards are the same are the
debates over the enactment and amendment of Title VII in
which the special relationship between the statute and the
Constitution was repeatedly featured. On occasion, courts have
followed the implications of this comparison to broaden the
meaning of equality. However, the convergence of the statutory
and constitutional standards has more often functionally
constrained the concept of equality and restricted antidiscrimination remedies for historically disadvantaged groups.
This Part explains how.
A.

Scholarly Authority

Scholars have asserted that Title VII and equal protection
embody the same standards. This perspective derives from the
sense that from a historical perspective, the meaning of the
statute is tethered to the constitutional guarantee of equality.
Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress is
specifically given a role in enforcing the Equal Protection Clause

See

Kimberl6

Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv L Rev 1331,
14

1361-63 (1988) (describing the neoconservative embrace of colorblindness and retreat
from civil rights enforement as retrenchment).
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though implementing legislation, and Title VII-The Civil
Rights Act-at least in part rests upon this enforcement
power. 15 Thus, it is argued that the purpose of the statute is "to
extend the constitutional prohibition against discrimination
from the public to the private sphere." 16 In that sense, the
statute can be read as an expression of what equal protection
means.
In an earlier period, the Court endorsed this view.
Katzenbach u Morgan17 affirmed congressional authority to
enact voting rights legislation that contradicted the Court's
interpretation because it read Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to confer on Congress the power to substantively
interpret constitutional meaning.18 While Katzenbach's holding
that Congress has the power to define rights guaranteed in
Section 1 has been called into question, 19 arguably the Civil
Rights Act should still be understood as a congressional
interpretation of equal protection. 20
1"
Section 5 provides that "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." US Const Amend XIV, § 5. There
has been much debate about the scope of Section 5 power. See, for example, Ruth Colker,
The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L Rev 653, 662-64 (2000) ("[T]he framers and
ratifiers of section five intended to give Congress broad powers to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause. . . . Although commentators disagree about the proper scope of the
state action requirement, no one disputes that the framers and ratifiers intended
Congress to have broader authority under section five than merely to enforce what the
Supreme Court had already decided was unconstitutional under section one."); Robert C.
Post and Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
PolicentricInterpretationof the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L J 1943, 1945
(2003) ("How to conceive of the relationship between the legislative power established in
Section 5 and the judicial power authorized by Section 1 is one of the deep puzzles of
American constitutional law. . . . The history of Section 5 doctrine has been one of
turmoil and revision.").
16 George Rutherglen
and Daniel R. Ortiz, Affirmative Action Under the
Constitution and Title VIL From Confusion to Convergence, 35 UCLA L Rev 467, 470
(1988) ("[T]he main purpose of Title VII is clear enough: like other titles of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, it was designed to extend the constitutional prohibition against
discrimination from public to private action.").
1
384 US 641 (1966).
18

Id at 651.

See City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 527-528 (1997) ("There is language in
our opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, which could be interpreted as acknowledging a
power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights contained in § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This is not a necessary interpretation, however, or even the
best one.") (citations omitted).
20 See Serena J. Hoy, Interpreting Equal Protection: Congress, the Court, and the
Civil Rights Acts, 16 J L & Polit 381, 383-84 (2000) (arguing that the Civil Rights Acts
that include Title VII were "not ordinary statutes" but were congressional
interpretations of the Constitution and should be seen as a source of constitutional
19
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Moreover, in 1972 when Title VII was amended to include
state and local government employers, Congress reaffirmed the
notion that Title VII implemented the constitutional prohibition
of discrimination. 2 1 That being so, Title VII and equal protection
would presumably converge. Certainly, the legislative history
does not suggest that Congress intended to define discrimination
under the statute differently than discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause. 22 As a matter of logic, this position
would seem to have considerable appeal. However, in the
context of the Court's jurisprudence it has neither been the
dominant view nor has it been one that has aligned with the
objective of eliminating racial inequality.
B.

Disparate Impact: Before Washington v Davis

The view that the Constitution and Title VII define
discrimination and construct remediation in the same terms has
been expressed in the context of disparate impact analysis.
Indeed, this argument was part of the backdrop to the debate in
Davis itself. Congress endorsed Griggs' disparate impact
framework during the debates over the 1972 Equal Employment
Opportunity Act that amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.23 Moreover, in the five-year period after Griggs was
decided in 1971 and prior to Davis, lower federal courts
routinely held that the Title VII standard articulated in Griggs
applied in equal protection cases. Under this standard, racially
disparate impact of routine institutional practices triggered a
requirement that the government, like the employer in Griggs,

norms).
21 The legislative history of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964, provided:
The expansion of Title VII coverage to State and local government employment
is firmly embodied in the principles of the Constitution.... The clear intention
of the Constitution, embodied in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments,
is to prohibit all forms of discrimination. Legislation to implement this aspect
of the Thirteenth amendment is long overdue.
HR Rep No 92-238, 92d Cong, 1st Sess 19 (1971), reprinted in 1972 USCAN 2137, 2154.
22 See David A. Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent and the
Taming of Brown, 56 U Chi
L Rev 935, 950 (1989) (pointing to the legislative history expressing the view that
discrimination under the statute and under Equal Protection was perceived to be the
same).
23 See HR Rep No 92-238, 92d Cong, 1st Sess 21-22 (1971),
reprinted in 1972
USCCAN 2137; S Rep No 92-415, 92d Cong, 1st Sess 5 & n 1, 14 (1971).
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justify their continuation. Courts of appeals and district courts
in multiple jurisdictions adopted Griggs' burden-shifting
framework in evaluating equal protection challenges to facially
neutral procedures that produced racial inequality in public
employment, urban renewal, zoning, public housing, and
municipal services. 24 The plaintiffs in Davis, black applicants to
the Washington D.C. police department, challenged the use of
Test 21, a general civil service exam, as invalid under equal
protection because logically the government should be held to
the same standard as a private employer under Title VII. 2 5 This
was why the lower court in Davis held that because Test 21
produced a racially exclusionary effect, the burden shifted to the
government to prove that the test was related to job
performance and was justified by business necessity. 2 6
Incorporating the Griggs test into the constitutional analysis,
the court of appeals found that this burden had not been met as
the proffered validity study showing a correlation between
scores on the test and performance in recruit school was
insufficient to establish job relatedness. 27
The Supreme Court ultimately repudiated this line of
cases. 28 To justify this reversal, the Court invoked precedent,
Davis, 426 US at 244 n 12 (1976) ("Cases dealing with public employment
include: Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176-1177 (CA2 1972); Castro v.
Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732-733 (CA1 1972); Bridgeport Guardians v. Bridgeport Civil
Service Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1337 (CA2 1973); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F.
Supp. 1187, 1200 (Md.), aff'd in pertinent part sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134
(CA4 1973); Douglas v. Hampton, 168 U.S. App. D.C. 62, 67, 512 F.2d 976, 981 (1975);
but ef. Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1096-1097 (CA5 1975), cert. pending, No. 751026. There are also District Court cases: Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension
Seru., 372 F. Supp. 126, 143 (ND Miss. 1974); Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F.Supp. 723, 736,
737 (ND Ohio 1975); United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543, 553 (ND Ill.
1974); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 351 F. Supp. 721, 724 (D. Minn. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 498 F.2d 143 (CA8 1974). In other contexts there are Norwalk CORE v.
Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (CA2 1968) (urban renewal); Kennedy
Park Homes Assn. u. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (CA2 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1010, 91 S.Ct. 1256, 28 L.Ed.2d 546 (1971) (zoning); Southern Alameda Spanish
Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (CA9 1970) (dictum) (zoning);
Metropolitan H. D. Corp. u. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (CA7), cert.
granted, December 15, 1975,423 U.S. 1030, 96 S.Ct. 560, 46 L.Ed.2d 404 (1975) (zoning);
Gautreaux u. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 738 (CA7 1971) (dictum) (public housing); Crow v.
Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 391 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (CA5 1972) (public
housing); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (CA5 1971), aff'd on rehearing en
banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (1972) (municipal services).").
2'
Davis, 426 US at 432-434.
26 Davis u Washington, 348 F Supp 15, 16 (DDC
1972).
27 Davis u Washington, 512 F2d 956, 961-65
(DC Cir 1975).
28 Davis, 426 US
at 238-248.
24
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reading Palmer v Thompson 29 to require invidious motive as an
essential part of an equal protection claim. 30 In fact, Palmer
treated evidence that the closure of public swimming pools was
motivated by racially discriminatory animus as largely
irrelevant. 31 In determining that there was no constitutional
violation, Palmer asserted that the City's actions produced no
disparate impact, as the pools were closed to everyone. 32 Davis
interpreted this language as "dicta" because "[Palmer] did not
involve, much less invalidate, a statute or [ordinance] having
neutral purposes but disproportionate racial consequences." 33 In
response, the dissent charged that the majority ignored logic
and precedent in reaching this conclusion: Instead, the equal
protection standard should not differ from that imposed on
private actors. 34
Davis resolved the debate over the relationship between
Title VII and equal protection by holding that the constitutional
standard for establishing discrimination should be more
stringent than the statute. The Court has not since expended
much effort in explaining precisely why this should be so, but
rather treats the matter as settled. For a brief period, however,
the presumption was that with regard to disparate impact, the
statute and the Constitution articulated the same standard. The
trend of this doctrinal logic was to expand equality for racial
minorities by proscribing the use of unnecessary neutral rules
that disproportionately disadvantaged them.
Conversely, court decisions have endorsed the view that
Title VII and equal protection standards are equivalent in
contexts where the reach of anti-discrimination measures and
permissible remediation have been restricted rather than
expanded. As the Court has articulated the equal protection
standard in more stringent terms-requiring proof of specific
intent to challenge racially disparate impact and compelling
reasons to justify even limited forms of race-conscious
403 US 217 (1971).
so Davis, 426 US at 242-45.
s Palmer, 403 US at 224 (1971) ("[N]o case in this Court has held that a legislative
act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted
29

for it.").
32

Id at 225.

" Davis, 426 US at 242-45 (describing Palmer as a case in which dicta, but not the
holding, indicated the relevance of disproportionate impact).
34 Id at 256 (Brennan and Marshall dissenting).
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remediation-it has also construed the Title VII standard to
conform to this more restrictive constitutional metric. The next
section considers this trajectory with respect to disparate
treatment as well as affirmative action.
C.

Disparate Treatment

A prime example of the conflation of the constitutional and
statutory disparate treatment standards involves the issue of
pregnancy. In General Electric Co v Gilbert,35 the Court
considered whether the exclusion of pregnancy under an
employer sponsored disability insurance plan constituted a
violation of Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination. 36
Gilbert affirmed the holding and reasoning of an earlier equal

protection

case,

Geduldig

u

Aiello, 37

that

pregnancy

classifications were not sex discrimination 38 because "pregnant
women and non-pregnant persons" involved the former group
which is "exclusively female" while the latter is not. 39 Even
though in Gilbert, the appellate court had considered Geduldig
and concluded that the statutory and constitutional standards
differed, 40 the Court specifically rejected this distinction.
Accordingly, the statutory interpretation converged with the
constitutional doctrine.
The majority disputed Justice Stevens' dissent, which
argued that the definition of discrimination under the
Constitution and Title VII were not the same:4 1
[W]hile there is no necessary inference that Congress, in
choosing [Title VII] language, intended to incorporate
into Title VII the concepts of discrimination which have
evolved from court decisions construing the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
similarities between the congressional language and

" 429 US 125 (1976).
Id at 127.
1
417 US 484 (1974).
"' Id at 496-97.
39
Gilbert, 429 US at 135.
40 Gilbert u General Electric Co, 519 F2d 661, 665-66 (4th Cir 1975), revd, 429 US
125 (1976).
41 Gilbert, 429 US at 160 (Stevens
dissenting).
1
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some of those decisions surely indicate that the latter are
a useful starting point in interpreting the former. 42
In this instance, the connection between Title VII and equal
protection was invoked to justify the exclusion of pregnancy
from sex discrimination and to narrow the scope of antidiscrimination protection.
Gilbert was ultimately overruled by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 under which Congress amended Title
VII to include discrimination because of pregnancy as
discrimination on the basis of sex.43 Despite substantial
criticism, Geduldig has never been overruled.4 4 Presently, then,
the statutory protection of pregnancy discrimination exceeds the
constitutional standard. 4
42

Id at 133. The Court further asserted:

The concept of "discrimination," of course, was well known at the time of the
enactment of Title VII, having been associated with the Fourteenth
Amendment for nearly a century, and carrying with it a long history ofjudicial
construction. When Congress makes it unlawful for an employer to
"discriminate ...

because of ...

sex . . .," without further explanation of its

meaning, we should not readily infer that it meant something different from
what the concept of discrimination has traditionally meant[.] There is surely no
reason for any such inference here.
Id at 145 (citations omitted).
43 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 USC § 2000e (2006).
44 See, for example,
Shannon E. Liss, The Constitutionality of Pregnancy

Discrimination: The Lingering Effects of Geduldig and Suggestions for Forcing Its
Reversal, 23 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 59, 90 (1997) (describing various state court
decisions that challenged the rationale in Geduldig); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and
the Constitution, 132 U Pa L Rev 955, 983 & n 107 (1984) (noting that "[c]riticizing
Geduldig has [ ] become a cottage industry," and in 1984 citing '[o]ver two dozen law
review articles [that] condemned both the Court's approach and the result."); Peter

Nicolas, Gay Rights, Equal Protection,and the Classification-FramingQuandary,21 Geo
Mason L Rev 329, 348 (2014) ("However, the Court's equal protection holding in
Geduldig-at least for now-remains good law.").
41 Ironically then while Gilbert relied upon Geduldig's narrow reading of equal
protection, with the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Title VII has been
expanded beyond the constitutional constraints. Because Title VII also was amended to
cover governmental actors, this divergence between constitutional and statutory
standards has been less salient. Although this difference may have less practical
significance given that governmental employers now must comply with the statute, the
formalist logic of the case ignores that pregnancy is still intrinsically bound up with
women as a social category even though not all women have been or ever will be
pregnant. In erasing the social meaning and significance of pregnancy to the category of
women, Geduldig implicitly legitimates the asymmetric organization of social control
and the exercise of the coercive power of law over women's reproductive lives. See also

Deborah A Ellis, Protecting "PregnantPersons": Women's Equality and Reproductive
Freedom, 6 Seton Hall Const L J 967, 969 (1996) ("With regard to pregnancy, the flaw in
the Court's current analysis is that it has refused to recognize that pregnancy

106
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Affirmative Action

The Court has equated the scope of Title VII and equal
protection in the context of affirmative action, but because that
doctrine has been conflicted and unstable, with shifting
majorities and dissents, it has not consistently done so.
Moreover, distinctions between private and public employers
and between voluntary and court imposed race conscious
remedial programs have played significant roles in making
differences between the statutory and constitutional parameters
of affirmative action salient. Nevertheless, explicit claims that
Title VII and equal protection standards applicable to
affirmative action are equivalent have been advanced, often
against the backdrop of narrowing jurisprudential concepts of
equality under the constitution. In this section, I consider how
the arguments for convergence have been featured in debates
over voluntary affirmative action, for both public and private
employers.
Voluntary affirmative action plans enacted by private
employers have been evaluated under Title VII: public
employers' plans have been tested under the statute or under
the Equal Protection Clause. Because of the widely held view
that voluntary plans imposed by private employers do not
implicate state action, the Court has held that they fall outside
the constitutional parameters of equal protection.4 6 On the other

discrimination is gender discrimination."); Liss, 23 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 69 (cited
in note 44) ("Geduldig has even wider repercussions in the broader reproductive rights
arena. By denying that laws or policies affecting pregnant women affect the
opportunities of women in general, Geduldig restricts the possibility of shifting the legal
foundation of abortion and reproductive rights from grounds of privacy to grounds of
equality."); Neil S. Siegel and Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg
on Pregnancy DiscriminationAs Sex Discrimination,59 Duke L J 771, 773 (2010) ("The
brief demonstrates that, from the very beginning, Justice Ginsburg has conceived
discrimination against pregnant women as a core case of sex discrimination. In 1972,
Ginsburg understood pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination because she has
long viewed laws enforcing sex roles of the separate spheres tradition as compromising
the 'equal citizenship stature' of women."); Wendy S. Strimling, The Constitutionalityof
State Laws ProvidingEmployment Leave for Pregnancy: Rethinking Geduldig After Cal
Fed, 77 Cal L Rev 171, 173-74 (1989) ("The Court's biologistic reasoning fails to
acknowledge that society's treatment of pregnancy affects gender equality. . . . Equal
protection doctrine must be revised, beginning with an acceptance of the premise that
society's treatment of pregnancy affects gender equality.").
46 See Carl E. Brody, Jr, A Historical Review of Affirmative Action and the
Interpretationof Its Legislative Intent by the Supreme Court, 29 Akron L Rev 291, 31314 (1996) ("Private affirmative action is unique because neither the Fifth nor the
Fourteenth Amendment is applicable; there is no government action involved. Therefore,
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hand, despite the fact that Title VII also applies to public
employers, because plaintiffs have not raised both statutory and
equal protection claims within the same case, the Court has not
assessed a government employer's voluntary affirmative plan
under both Title VII and equal protection standards.4 7
Members of the Court and some commentators have
embraced the notion that Title VII and equal protection
standards governing race sensitive affirmative action impose the
same constraints. However, even as the Court has upheld
specific voluntary plans, the arguments for convergence often
have functioned to narrow the permissible scope of race
conscious remediation. This section examines that trajectory.
1.

The emergence of convergence under Title VII.

The Court has considered challenges to voluntary
affirmative action plans created by private employers under
Title VII in United Steelworkers u Weber 4 8 and by public

employers in Johnson u TransportationAgency of Santa Clara
County.4 9 In neither case did the Court decide the precise
question of the constitutionality of the plan: Even against a
government employer, the plaintiff in Johnson raised only a
statutory challenge.5 0 But the debate among the justices over
plaintiffs seeking redress from private affirmative action programs are required to use
Title VII."); Private Voluntary Affirmative Action Under Title VII, 93 Harv L Rev 243,
245 n 10 (1979) (stating that the Court's review of United Steelworkers of America v
Weber, 443 US 193 (1979) "did not involve an alleged violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because no state action was involved"); Roy L. Brooks, The
Affirmative Action Issue: Law, Policy, and Morality, 22 Conn L Rev 323, 338 (1990)
(dividing affirmative action analysis into three categories: "(1) an equal protection
standard applicable to public employer affirmative action programs for minorities ('strict
scrutiny standard'); (2) an equal protection standard applicable to public employer
affirmative action programs for females ('intermediate scrutiny standard'), on which the
Supreme Court has not yet spoken; and (3) a Title VII standard applicable to public or
private affirmative action programs for minorities or females ('Title VII standard' or 'low
scrutiny standard')").
47 Timothy N. Tack, The Supreme Court's Revenue of Voluntary Affirmative Action
by Public Employers: Applying Different Standards Under Title VII and the Constitution,
26 Willamette L Rev 957, 959 n 7 (1990) (stating that the Court "has only decided cases
where either a Title VII or equal protection claim was presented for review" and citing
both Johnson v TransportationAgency of Santa Clara County, 480 US 616 (1987) and
Wygant v Jackson Board of Education, 476 US 267 (1986) as examples of the Court's
singular analysis because plaintiffs based their claims on either statutory or
constitutional grounds).
48 443 US 193 (1979).
49 480 US 616 (1987).
'o Id at 620 n 2. Johnson could have raised an Equal Protection challenge, but did
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whether Title VII and equal protection imposed the same limits
on the use of affirmative action included explicit claims that the
standards were the same. This was hardly the prevailing view,
however, as several of the plurality opinions argued that the
standards were different. Convergence largely functioned at the
perimeters of the debate but it ultimately came to have greater
traction in authorizing the incorporation of heightened proof
standards into equal protection analysis of public employer
affirmative action plans. Put another way, the claim that the
standards are the same has been deployed in the context of
increasing the burden of proof on employers seeking to
implement affirmative action. I consider how the arguments for
convergence emerged in the context of the leading Title VII
cases, Weber and Johnson.
In Weber, the Court sought to define the parameters of the
statutory constraints imposed on voluntary affirmative action.
The employer in the case, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical
Company, was a major industrial manufacturer whose unionized
craft workforce was almost exclusively white.5 1 A collective
bargaining agreement between Kaiser and the union opened up
the job training opportunities for craft positions previously
restricted to persons with prior experience-a prerequisite that
excluded virtually all black workers as a result of the union's
racially exclusionary practices. 52 To address this imbalance, the
parties agreed to goals for minority representation that were set
according to the proportion of the minority population in the
labor market. Qualified incumbents were ranked by seniority:
One minority employee was to be selected for each white
employee from the pool until the goals were reached. 53 Because
of prior racially discriminatory practices, black candidates
selected for the training program had less seniority than some
whites, like Brian Weber. 54 He charged that the employer's
action violated Title VII's prohibition against disparate
treatment based on race 5 5 and further violated the statute's
not. Id.
51
12

54

Weber, 443 US at 198-99.
Id at 198.
Id at 199.
Id.

Section 703(a) prohibits discrimination "against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . ." 42 USC § 2000e-2(a).

109

LIMITING EQUALITY

95]

disclaimer of any interpretation requiring "preferential
treatment" on the basis of race to correct workforce imbalance.5 6
Writing for the majority, Brennan's opinion concluded that
the plan did not violate the statute, given the legislative history:
Because a primary objective of the act was "to open employment
opportunities for Blacks in occupations ...

traditionally closed

to them," interpreting the statute to prohibit employers from
voluntarily exercising management prerogatives to provide
those opportunities would frustrate that purpose.57 Simply put,
notwithstanding the statutory wording, discrimination within
the meaning of the statute did not include race conscious
decisions made pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan. The
dissent vigorously contested the majority's reading of the
legislative history and charged that its holding ignored the plain
meaning of the statutory language. 5 8
Seven years later, in Johnson, the Court extended Weber's
rationale to public employers, interpreting the statute to permit
affirmative action measures designed to address historic and
persistent patterns of exclusion.5 9 The disappointed white male
candidate, Johnson, asserted that the state's reliance on a
voluntary affirmative action program to promote Joyce, a female
employee, to a historically all-male position constituted a
violation of Title VII. While both candidates met the minimal
qualifications, Johnson scored two points higher than Joyce on
the relevant test and claimed he was therefore better qualified.6 0
However, the government disputed this assertion and argued
that the agency's decision was in furtherance of the long term
objective of attaining a work force that better represented the
local labor force, 61 as well as short term goals which "set aside
no

specific

number

of

positions

...

but

authorized

The statute provides that,

1

Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer . . . to grant preferential treatment . . . to any group because of the
race . . . of such . . . group on account of an imbalance which may exist with

respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race ...
community ... or in the available work force in any community.

42 USC § 2000e-2(j).
7 Weber, 443 US at 208.
Id at 217 (Burger dissenting); id at 228-30 (Rehnquist dissenting).
'9 Johnson, 480 US at 628.
60 Id at 623-25.
61
Idat 621-22.
58

in any

the
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consideration of ethnicity or sex as a factor when evaluating
qualified candidates for jobs in which members of such groups
were poorly represented." 62 As Johnson raised no equal
protection challenge, the Court did not consider the
constitutional issue. 63 Relying on Weber's reasoning, the
majority in Johnson asserted that evidence of a manifest
imbalance in the workforce would provide crucial justification
for the implementation of an affirmative action plan consistent
with Title VII's objective of "break[ing] down old patterns of
racial segregation and hierarchy."6 4 The Court specifically noted
that the Title VII standard differed from the constitutional
metric, because Title VII "was enacted pursuant to the
commerce power to regulate purely private decision making"
and was not intended to instantiate constitutional standards.6 5
In contrast, Justice Scalia asserted that with respect to a
public employer, Title VII and constitutional standards should
be considered equivalent. 66 On this view, because under equal
protection
analysis
the
Court
had rejected
societal
discrimination as a compelling governmental interest sufficient
to justify a race conscious layoff plan, similarly Santa Clara
could not rely on societal patterns of inequality as a justification
to choose a "less-qualified" female candidate over Johnson. 67
With respect to the relationship between the statute and equal
protection, Scalia argued:

62 Id at 622. The agency's supervisor invoked the plan in
making the decision
stating that he considered, "the whole picture, the combination of her qualifications and
Mr. Johnson's qualifications, their test scores, their expertise, their background,
affirmative action matters, things like that ... I believe it was a combination of all of
those." Id at 625.
6
Steven M. Woodside and Jan Howell Marx, Walking the Tightrope Between Title
VII and Equal Protection:Public Sector Voluntary Affirmative Action After Johnson and
Wygant, 20 Urban Law 367, 369-70 (1988).
64 Johnson, 480 US at 629, quoting Weber, 443 US at 208.
61 Johnson, 480 US at 627 n 6. The Court drew a distinction between
Title VI and
Title VII: Title VI represented the exercise of federal power over a matter in which the
Federal Government was already directly involved-the use of federal funds. Id. In
contrast Title VII involved the regulation of private entities and thus was not grounded
in equal protection, but in Congress powers to regulate interstate commerce.
66 Id at 664-68 (Scalia dissenting).
67 Scalia was referring to Wygant u Jackson Board of Education, 476 US 267 (1986),
which held that societal discrimination was insufficient to justify a school board's
decision to modify seniority rules and retain a less senior black teacher over a white one
during layoffs. Id at 276. See Section II for a discussion at greater length of this decision.
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While Mr. Johnson does not advance a constitutional
claim here, it is most unlikely that Title VII was intended
to place a lesser restraint on discrimination by public
actors than is established by the Constitution. The Court
has already held that the prohibitions on discrimination
in Title VI are at least as stringent as those in the
Constitution. There is no good reason to think that Title
VII, in this regard, is any different from Title VI.
Because, therefore, those justifications (e.g., the
remedying of past societal wrongs) that are inadequate to
insulate
discriminatory
action from the
racial
discrimination prohibitions of the Constitution are also
inadequate to insulate it from the racial discrimination
prohibitions of Title VII; and because the portions of Title
VII at issue here treat race and sex equivalently; Wygant,
which dealt with race discrimination, is fully applicable
precedent, and is squarely inconsistent with today's
decision. 68
Although Justice O'Connor differed from Justice Scalia
regarding the validity of the plan at issue, she similarly argued
that the standards for evaluating voluntary affirmative action
plans under Title VII and equal protection are equivalent:
[T]he proper initial inquiry in evaluating the legality of
an affirmative action plan by a public employer under
Title VII is no different from that required by the Equal
Protection Clause. In either case, consistent with the
congressional intent to provide some measure of
protection to the interests of the employer[s'] [white]
employees, the employer must have had a firm basis for
believing that remedial action was required. 69
That firm basis, according to O'Connor, can be established
by pointing to a "statistical disparity sufficient to support a
prima facie claim under Title VII .

.

. of a pattern or practice

claim of discrimination."7 0 On this view, the employer's decision
at issue in Johnson did not violate the statute because the
promotion of a qualified woman over a marginally better
£8
69
70

Johnson, 480 US at 664-65 (Scalia dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id at 649 (O'Connor concurring).
Id.
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qualified man was against the backdrop of evidence of
discrimination equivalent to prima facie proof of a pattern or
practice violation.
Scalia's argument was a repudiation of race-conscious
remediation more broadly, rendering it permissible only in
narrow exceptions, while O'Connor found that the necessary
justification for an employer to examine racial impact was
satisfied by a firm basis in evidence that remediation was
required.7 1 Notably, while Scalia and O'Connor held opposing
views on whether Joyce's selection pursuant to the agency's
affirmative action plan was justifiable under the statute, they
concurred that the statutory and constitutional standards to
evaluate the government's voluntary affirmative action plan
should be the same.
What remained unresolved is precisely where the
evidentiary bar is or should be: As the debate in subsequent
cases revealed, the dispute persisted over whether the proof
standards under Title VII and equal protection should be
harmonized by leveling up, towards more limited definitions of
discriminatory conduct and more restraints on affirmative
action, or whether the more deferential statutory analysis
should govern. 72 In important respects, the claim that Title VII
and equal protection impose the same limitations on affirmative
action rested on an analysis that narrowed the grounds upon
which affirmative action could be justified, albeit to differing
degrees.
2.

Convergence under equal protection.

While Weber and Johnson illustrate the trend towards
convergence under Title VII, a similar trajectory emerged under
equal protection as illustrated by Wygant u Jackson Board of
Id at 664-65 (Scalia dissenting); id at 649 (O'Connor concurring).
Compare Rothe Development Corp v Department of Defense, 545 F3d 1023, 1040
(Fed Cir 2008) (stating a stricter and less deferential standard requiring that a
governmental body must provide a "substantially probative" foundation for the "strong
basis in evidence" as a necessary predicate for race conscious action) with Dean v City of
Shreveport, 438 F3d 448, 455 (5th Cir 2006) (deferring more to the government, saying:
"Thus, to the extent our prior decisions were unclear, we now clarify that when a
governmental unit employs a race-conscious remedy, it need not have already made a
formal finding of past discrimination. Nevertheless, if the remedy is later challenged, the
reviewing court must ensure there was strong evidence of past discrimination
warranting the remedy."). See generally Herman N. (Rusty) Johnson, Jr., The Evolving
Strong-Basis-in-EvidenceStandard,32 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 347 (2011).
71
72
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Education.73 At issue in Wygant was the constitutionality of
race-sensitive seniority based layoffs initiated pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement between the Jackson School
Board and the teachers' union.7 4 The complex factual
background revealed a fraught racial terrain in which the School
Board, under pressure from agency investigations of
discriminatory conduct and minority underrepresentation and
related social unrest, initiated a plan to hire black teachers that
significantly increased their number over a two-year period.7 5
However, because the original agreement provided for reverse
seniority ordered layoffs, when financial cutbacks were required,
the newly hired black teachers were laid off, erasing the recently
secured gains. After racial violence erupted in the schools, the
teachers union and the Board renegotiated the layoff provision
to provide that "at no time will there be a greater percentage of
minority personnel laid off than the current percent of minority
personnel employed at the time of the layoff."7 6 Subsequently,
the Board declined to follow the provision when layoffs were
again required.7 7 The union and the laid off minority teachers
sued and won relief in state court, although the opinion
concluded that there was no proof that the Board had engaged
in overt discrimination; rather, the absence of minority teachers
was the result of "societal discrimination." 78 In accordance with
the contractual formula, the board then laid off some white
teachers with greater seniority than their black counterparts.7 9
The laid-off white teachers challenged the school board's
decision as racial discrimination proscribed by the Equal
Protection Clause.
Justice Powell's opinion applied strict scrutiny review in
holding that the school board's plan violated equal protection.8 0
The Court found that the Board's goal of remedying societal
discrimination was not a compelling governmental interest, nor
476 US 267 (1986).
Id at 267.
7
Id at 297-299 (Marshall dissenting).
7
Id at 270. Justice Marshall's dissent pointed to the significant disruption that
had resulted from that lack of black teachers in a school system where so many of the
students were black. Id at 299 (Marshall dissenting).
7

74

7

Wygant, 476 US at 271.

78

79

Id at 272.
Id.

80

Id at 273-74.
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was the preservation of positions for black teachers in order to
serve as role models for black students: Some showing that the
school board had previously engaged in racial discrimination
was required before race could be taken into account.8 1
Moreover, the plan did not meet the requirement of narrow
tailoring because the layoffs imposed too high a burden on
"innocent" third parties. 82
Powell noted that while the school board had justified the
plan as an effort to remedy the racial disparity in the teaching
staff, it erroneously compared the percentage of black teachers
to the percentage of black students rather than comparing the
employer's workforce to the number of qualified persons in the
appropriate labor market as was done in systemic
discrimination cases. 83 Further, he criticized the role model
theory employed by the Board as "ha[ving] no logical stopping
point."8 4 The board's assertion that the purpose of the plan was
to remedy its own prior discrimination was rejected as untimely,
contradicted by prior claims and ultimately, not germane even if
proven because the layoff provision was not a legally appropriate
means of achieving a compelling governmental interest.8 5
Layoffs, Powell contended, "disrupt these settled expectations in
a way that general hiring goals do not" and "impose the entire
burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals." 86
Vigorously dissenting, Justice Marshall disputed the notion
that the layoff provisions were unjustified, noting the prior
agency findings that the Board had discriminated, as well as the
affirmative vote of the 80 percent white union in favor of the
renegotiated compromise agreement.8 7 Fundamentally, he
argued that while the Court had previously failed to specifically
elect between strict scrutiny and intermediate review as the
appropriate standard, the plan should pass muster because of
Jackson's recent history as well as the overarching objective of
supporting settlements.8 8 Justice Stevens also contested the

81 Wygant, 476 US at 275-76.
82

Id at 281-83.

83 Id at 275 (Powell) (plurality).
84 Id at
275.
85
8"
87
8

Wygant, 476 US at 283.
Id at 283.
Id at 299 (Marshall dissenting).
Id at 302-06 (Marshall dissenting).
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majority's framework. In his view, the appropriate question was
not whether there was proof that the Board had discriminated
in the past in order to establish "some sort of special entitlement
to jobs as a remedy for sins [ ] committed in the past;" rather,
the question was "whether the Board's action advances the
public interest in educating children for the future."8 9
Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority in rejecting
the Board's justification as insufficient, and advanced an
argument that Title VII and equal protection standards to
evaluate an employer's voluntary affirmative action plan
converged. Her opinion endeavored to bridge the gap between
the majority and dissenting opinions, contending that the
difference between the strict scrutiny standard advocated by
Powell and the less stringent analyses endorsed by the
dissenting justices was not significant.9 0 In her view, there was
consensus on the factual predicate to meet the requisite
governmental interest-remediation of past or present racial
discrimination by the governmental actor.9 1 Moreover, while she
agreed that remedying prior discrimination was a compelling
governmental interest, a formal finding of actual discrimination
was not "a constitutional prerequisite." 92 Indeed, were it so, the
value of voluntary compliance would be undermined. 93 This
value, she argued "is doubly important when it is a public
employer that acts, both because of the example its voluntary
assumption sets, and because the remediation of governmental
discrimination is of unique importance."9 4

89

Wygant, 476 US at 313 (Stevens dissenting).

90 Id at 286 (O'Connor concurring).
91

Id. Specifically, she stated:

"[R]emedying past or present racial discrimination by a state actor is a
sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully
constructed affirmative action program. This remedial purpose need not be
accompanied by contemporaneous findings of actual discrimination to be
accepted as legitimate as long as the public actor has a firm basis for believing
that remedial action is required."
She also noted that other governmental interests, like diversity, might be considered. Id.
92 Id at
289.

Wygant, 476 US at 289 (O'Connor concurring).
Id at 290. In support of her contention that correcting governmental
discrimination held particular significance, she cited the congressional debates on the
extension of Title VII to government employers: "Discrimination by government . ..
serves a doubly destructive purpose. The exclusion of minorities from effective
participation in the bureaucracy not only promotes ignorance of minority problems in
93

94
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Moreover, to insist that a government employer make a
contemporaneous finding of discrimination to justify an
affirmative action plan "would produce the anomalous result
that what private employers may voluntarily do to correct
apparent violations of Title VII, public employers are
constitutionally forbidden to do to correct their statutory and
constitutional transgressions." 9 In O'Connor's view, preserving
the space for voluntary compliance argued for congruence and
against the notion that the constitutional standard for
evaluating a public employer's race conscious remedial efforts
should be higher and more difficult to meet than the standard
justifying a private employer's program under Title VII. In
formally rejecting the notion of different standards she reasoned
that Wygant, the equal protection case, was consistent with
Weber, the Title VII case: Both affirmed that remediating past
or present discrimination is sufficient to warrant remedial
action but societal discrimination falls short of the requisite
predicate. 96
Relative to Scalia's position in Johnson, O'Connor's
formulation is less onerous, and would seem to authorize race
conscious plans under terms not dissimilar to those imposed by
the statute. However, O'Connor's conflation of the constitutional
and statutory standards implicitly authorized considerable
constraints on voluntary affirmative action that departed from
the Title VII analysis at least as articulated by Weber and
Johnson. Notwithstanding O'Connor's claim that Weber and
Wygant imposed the same requirements, the standard she
endorsed in Wygant required prima facie evidence of a pattern
or practice violation by the employer,9 7 while Weber permitted
voluntary affirmative action if the employer was seeking to
remedy "manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated
job categories." 9 8 Of course, the former could provide evidence of
prior discrimination by an employer, but these metrics do not
impose the same requirements: A manifest imbalance could
arise from the use of neutral practices even absent evidence of

that particular community, but also creates mistrust, alienation, and all too often
hostility toward the entire process of government." Id at 290-91.
95 Id at 291.
96 Id at 290 (O'Connor concurring).
97

Wygant, 476 US at 292 (O'Connor concurring).

98

Weber, 443 US at 197.
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the employer's prior discriminatory conduct or intent.9 9 This
distance between the statutory and constitutional standards is
obscured in O'Connor's argument. Importantly, in treating the
standards as congruent, O'Connor's opinion effectively raised
the bar on employers seeking to justify race conscious remedial
plans, directly under equal protection analysis and implicitly
under Title VII.
The legislative origins of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
and the historical context out of which it arose have been
mobilized to support an argument the statute and the equal
protection clause converge in facilitating the elimination of
racial inequality, but often the claim the standards are the same
has had a different and more restrictive valence. Certainly there
are noted instances where the notion of congruency has not
served to disable non-white plaintiffs from obtaining relief, but
the trend overall is towards greater constraints.
II. TITLE VII AND EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARDS DIVERGE

Often, the assertion that the statutory and constitutional
standards converge has been vigorously disputed. More
specifically, the general consensus is that the equal protection
metric is more stringent than the statute both in assessing
whether an employer has engaged in unlawful discrimination
and in determining the scope of permissible race conscious
remediation. 100 This part examines the claim that the standards
diverge in the context of disputes over disparate impact,
disparate treatment and affirmative action. Over time the
notion that the standards differ has functioned to foreclose more
robust conceptions of anti-discrimination measures to address
racial inequality.

99

Griggs, 401 US at 432.

See, for example, David D. Meyer, Note, Finding a Manifest Imbalance': The
Case for a Unified Statistical Test for Voluntary Affirmative Action Under Title VII, 87
100

Mich L Rev 1986, 1993-94 (1989). See also Richard N. Appel, Alison L. Gray, and Nilufer
Loy , Affirmative Action in the Workplace: Forty Years Later, 22 Hofstra Labor & Empl L
J 549, 564 n 104 (2005); Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The

Convergence of Traditional and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 Wm &
Mary L Rev 1031, 1036-38, 1049 (2004) (arguing that the standards for voluntary
affirmative action under Title VII allows for more expansive plans than under the Equal
Protection Clause).
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Scholarly Authority Establishes that the Standards Differ

Scholarly authority has largely concurred that the Equal
Protection Clause imposes different and more stringent
requirements than Title VII to justify race conscious affirmative
action. 101 Commentators point out that in particular, Title VII,
..

.

does not require an employer to suggest that it may itself be

guilty of past discrimination in order to justify the use of
affirmative action." 102 Curiously, this is treated more as settled
law than proposition to be defended. The question is why the
constitutional standard applied to affirmative action is or should
be more stringent than that required under the statute.
Washington v Davis proffered a rationale-albeit one open to
contest-to explain why the burden of proof to establish a
disparate impact violation under equal protection should be
higher than the burden under the statute. 103 However, no
similar justification has been advanced for the application of a
more rigid constitutional standard in this context, where
presumably government employers have at least an equal if not
stronger interest than private employers in addressing long
standing workforce imbalances. As O'Connor noted in Wygant,
unremedied discrimination by the government has a
particularly corrosive effect. 104
B.

Disparate Impact

In the context of disparate impact, the Davis Court
explicitly rejected the notion that the statutory and
constitutional standards are the same: Assessing a private
employer's conduct under Title VII "involves a more probing
judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly
reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is

101As one example, a leading employment discrimination textbook asserts, "There
has yet to be a definitive resolution of the continued vitality of the Weber/Johnson
approach because affirmative action plans used by public employers tend to be attacked
under the more demanding standards of the equal protection clause." Michael J. Zimmer,
Charles A Sullivan, and Rebecca Hanner White, Cases and Materials on Employment
Discrimination183 (Aspen 8th ed 2013).
102 Meyer, 87 Mich L Rev at 1993-94 (cited in note 100); Appel,
Gray, and Loy, 22
Hofstra Lab & Empl L J at 562-63 (cited in note 100); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of
Discrimination:Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 Harv L Rev 78, 92 (1986).
'0

Davis, 426 US at 240.

104

Wygant, 476 US at 290.
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appropriate under the Constitution where special racial impact,
without discriminatory purpose, is claimed."1 05 The Court
expressed concern that because racial disparity in state
institutions was ubiquitous, judicial intervention predicated on
disparate impact would be too frequent and all encompassing:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is
nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in
practice it benefits or burdens one race more than
another would be far-reaching and would raise serious
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of
tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing
statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to
the average black than to the more affluent white. 106
Because Title VII did not apply to public employers until
after the Davis case was pending and the plaintiffs did not
amend the complaint, 107 the Court avoided the question of
whether a public employer would be subject to the Griggs Title
VII standard. Were the Court to so hold, effectively the
distinction between the statute and the Constitution upon which
the Court relied practically would become irrelevant, at least in
the realm of employment. 108
C.

Disparate Treatment

In Gilbert, the dissent vigorously opposed the majority's
holding that the statutory and constitutional standards

'0

Davis, 426 US at 247.

106

Id at 248.
Id at 238 n 10.

107

10
The bifurcation between Title VII and Equal Protection with respect to disparate
impact has created uncertainty about the fate of a public employer charged with a
disparate impact case styled as a Griggs Title VII claim. Commentators have noticed and
critiqued this consequence of Davis. See, for example, Tack, 26 Willamette L Rev at 969
(cited in note 47) ("In effect, the Court carves out a Title VII exception from its general
rule that disparate impact analysis would be 'far reaching' and opens a Pandora's box,
but then refuses to apply that exception because the plaintiffs failed to allege a Title VII
violation in this particular case. Had the plaintiffs done so, the distinction between Title
VII and equal protection in the public employer context presumably would disappear.
Unfortunately, the Court has not had another occasion to fuse back together this
artificial break it created in Davis."). One could see Ricci as that opportunity. See Part
III(B)(1) (discussing Ricci as an endeavor to limit disparate impact through an equal
protection like analysis.).
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governing pregnancy discrimination were the same. 109 As the
prior section illustrates, Justice Stevens argued that the
meaning of discrimination under Title VII and equal protection
necessarily differed given that under the Court's precedents,
proving a constitutional violation is more difficult than proving
a violation of the statute. 110 Because of the enactment of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Court has not returned to
this debate in the context of interpreting the statute, and
because of the extension of Title VII to governmental employers,
it has not returned to the constitutional issue either.
Beyond the specific issue of pregnancy discrimination, the
debate in the cases illustrates a logical tension around the issue
of whether the statutory and constitutional standards should or
do converge or differ. On the one hand, the Court had clearly
demarcated Title VII from equal protection-Davis being a
prime example-but now determined that the statute and the
constitutional prohibition covered, and more relevantly
excluded, the same conduct. Despite Stevens' critique, this
seeming inconsistency was not one the Court addressed.
D.

Affirmative Action
1.

Voluntary affirmative action plans are treated
differently under Title VII and equal protection.

Leading cases assessing the validity of employers' voluntary
affirmative action plans have revealed a distinction between the
statutory and constitutional standards. Weber did so in the
context of a Title VII challenge to a private employer's plan
while Johnson held the standards were different in evaluating a
public employer's plan.
Weber has come to stand for the proposition that voluntary
affirmative action should not be subjected to stringent proof
requirements. Notwithstanding the language of the statute
prohibiting any interpretation that "require[s] any employer ...
to grant preferential treatment .

.

. because of .

.

. race .

.

. on

Gilbert, 429 US at 160 (Stevens dissenting).
no Specifically, Stevens noted, "The word "discriminate" does not appear in the
Equal Protection Clause. Since the plaintiffs' burden of proving a prima facie violation of
that constitutional provision is significantly heavier than the burden of proving a prima
facie violation of a statutory prohibition against discrimination, the constitutional
holding in Geduldig v Aiello, 417 US 484 (1974), does not control the question of
statutory interpretation presented by this case." Gilbert, 429 US at 160-61.
109
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account of . . . a[n] imbalance," the majority held that the

Company's race sensitive affirmative action plan was consistent
with Title VII's objective "to eliminate a manifest racial
imbalance."1 1 1 The Court further explained, "[A]n employer
seeking to justify the adoption of [a] . . . plan need not point to
its own prior discriminatory practices, nor even to evidence of an
'arguable violation' on its part. [With respect to the first part of
the test] it need only point to a 'conspicuous .

.

. imbalance in

traditionally segregated job categories."' 1 12 As Blackmun's
concurrence noted, Weber's plan was modeled on a prominent
settlement ratified by the courts between the Department of
Justice and the steel industry over charges of race and sex
discrimination that awarded a multimillion dollar settlement to
a class of over 50,000 workers and restructured hiring and
promotional practices. 1 13 The plan was in accord with important
examples of key industrial and business sectors resolving
discrimination complaints and prospectively reducing liability
through negotiated agreements. Thus, the Court endorsed a
more relaxed evaluation of voluntary employer prerogatives.1 14
Johnson affirmed that reviewing such plans under the
statute was different from the assessment under the Equal
Protection Clause. In Johnson the Court explained that the
requisite showing of a "manifest imbalance [in the workforce]
need not be such that it would support a prima facie case
against the employer . . . since we do not regard as identical the

constraints of Title VII and the Federal Constitution on
voluntarily adopted affirmative action plans."1 15 Scalia argued
that because Title VI's constraints are equivalent to the
constitutional standard, and Title VI resembles Title VII, so too
did Title VII standards converge with equal protection. 116
n. Weber, 443 US at 195.
112 Johnson, 480 US at 630, citing Weber,
443 US at 209, 212.
ns Weber, 433 US at 215-19 (Blackmun concurring). United States v AlleghenyLudlum Industries, 517 F2d 826 (5th Cir 1975), was one such example. In that case the
district court refused to vacate consent decrees that permanently enjoined the United
Steelworkers Union and nine major steel companies from discriminating on the basis of
race and required affirmative action plans establishing goals and timetables correcting
past discriminatory assignments, and back pay of over $30 million. Id at 833-37.
114 See Mary C. Daly, Some Runs, Some Hits, Some Errors-Keeping Score in the
Affirmative Action Ballpark from Weber to Johnson, 30 BC L Rev 1, 25 (1988).
n. Johnson, 480 US at 632.
n1 Id at 627 n 6. This statement by the majority ignores the fact that the legislative
history of the 1972 amendments, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, can be read to
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However, the Johnson plurality noted an important distinction
raised in Weber: Title VI was an exercise of federal authority
over federal money, a subject already within congressional
control, while Title VII was an extension of federal power to
private conduct and "was not intended to incorporate and
particularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments."11 7 Moreover, even considering the extension of
Title VII to cover public employers under the 1972 amendments:
[T]here is no evidence that this mere addition to the
definitional section of the statute was intended to
transform the substantive standard governing employer
conduct.... The fact that a public employer must also
satisfy the Constitution does not negate the fact that the
statutory prohibition with which that employer must
contend was not intended to extend as far as that of the
Constitution." 118
Thus, the plurality in Johnson reasoned that affirmative
action could be justified under Title VII upon evidence of
"manifest imbalance" as distinct from the more stringent equal
protection requirement of a prima facie case of pattern or
practice discrimination. 119
2.

The statutory and constitutional standards evaluating
court-imposed affirmative action are said to differ.

The premise that Title VII and equal protection impose
different demands and limitations has appeared in the context
of court-mandated affirmative action. In United States v
Paradise20 the Court considered a judicially constructed, raceconscious remedial plan imposed in response to the state's
failure to rectify a pattern of racial exclusion of black applicants
from employment and promotion in the Alabama Department of

imply otherwise.
117 Id, quoting Weber, 443
US at 206 n 6.
11
Johnson, 480 US at 632 n 6.
119 Id at 632-33 (noting that "[a]pplication of a prima facie standard in Title VII
cases would be inconsistent with Weber's focus on statistical imbalance, and could
inappropriately create a disincentive for employers to voluntarily adopt an affirmative
action plan").
120

480 US 149 (1987).
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Corrections.121 The plan ordered that in the event the
department had not developed and implemented an acceptable
promotion plan, at least 50 percent of the promotions should go
to qualified black applicants, if available. 122 Without explicitly
deciding the appropriate standard of equal protection review,
the Court upheld the plan under a strict scrutiny based analysis:
Even applying the most stringent test, remedying past and
present discrimination was a compelling state interest in light of
the Department's record of egregious discrimination and
resistance. 123 Moreover, the plan was narrowly tailored:
Alternatives were inadequate, the plan was flexible and
temporary, and did not impose an unacceptable burden on
innocent third parties. 124
Justice Powell's concurrence affirmed this analysis, but in a
footnote he opined that the standards of analysis under Title VII
and equal protection differed. 125 This comment was a rhetorical
aside that did not address the specific question of whether the
statutory and constitutional standards applicable to courtimposed affirmative action were the same. Powell's possible
implication-that something different than strict scrutiny
analysis-would be required, seems belied by the prevalence of
strict scrutiny discourse in assessing judicially mandated race
sensitive remedies under the statute or under equal
protection. 126 Indeed, as this next section illustrates, the
Id at 153.
Id at 163.
123 Id at
167.
124 Paradise,480 US at
177-79.
125 Id at 186 n 1 (Powell concurring) ("Although we need
not resolve the question in
this case, I have not thought the standards of analysis in Title VII and equal protection
cases-though similar-are identical."). Powell did not elaborate in this context, but the
statement could be read as consistent with his position in other cases. See, for example,
Davis, 426 US at 239. Justice Powell joined in the opinion written by Justice White
which reads, "We have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating
claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under
Title VII, and we decline to do so today." Id.
126 See Part III (discussing the similarities and transference
between Title VII and
Equal Protection in evaluating court ordered remedial plans). Moreover, commentators
have puzzled over Powell's meaning. Rutherglen and Ortiz, 35 UCLA L Rev at 502 (cited
in note 16), argue that this statement is particularly perplexing: "This possible
divergence should not be totally surprising, but its direction is. If the Constitution really
requires something different from Title VII, it does not, under Sheet Metal Workers,
require anything stronger than proof of egregious discrimination. Any divergence must
be in the direction of a weaker constitutional requirement. This is the opposite of the
divergence between the constitutional and statutory standards for voluntary preferences.
121
122

124

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2014

relationship between Title VII and equal protection standards
has been more symbiotic than might be suggested by any
marked or implied difference.
III. DOCTRINAL TRANSFERENCE BETWEEN EQUAL PROTECTION
AND TITLE VII

Even when the Courts have marked Title VII and
constitutional standards as formally distinct, aspects of equal
protection analysis have been imported into Title VII and Title
VII doctrine also has been incorporated into the constitutional
standard. The result is that the constitutional and statutory
standards have become more similar operationally even when
they are purportedly different. As governmental employers are
regulated both by Title VII and the constitution, equal
protection doctrine would necessarily influence the outcomes in
cases involving the government. But even with respect to the
voluntary actions of private employers, where the constitutional
constraints do not apply, equal protection doctrine has exerted
considerable influence on the interpretation of the statute. 12 7
This impact is evident in disparate impact and affirmative
action doctrine as well. While the cases sometimes distinguish
statutory and constitutional standards, the boundaries between

With respect to voluntary preferences, the Constitution requires a 'strong basis in
evidence' of prior discrimination, whereas Title VII requires only a 'manifest imbalance,'
a somewhat lesser showing. With respect to judicially ordered preferences, on the other
hand, Title VII requires egregious discrimination, while the Constitution may require
somewhat less. Thus, Title VII requires less than the Constitution in one context and
possibly more in the other." Id.
127 Others have
also argued that the constitutional standards exert greater
influence. A leading textbook on employment discrimination notes:
Even where affirmative action plans have been challenged under Title VII
alone, the Constitution has been visible in the background, influencing the
outcome in a variety of different ways: by providing the standards for
evaluating any form of government action involving affirmative action; by
defining the fundamental concept of discrimination that ultimately determines
the permissible forms of affirmative action; and by limiting the justifications
that can be offered for any kind of affirmative action plan. The standards for
permissible affirmative action under Title VII are . . . different from but similar
to the constitutional standards. How far apart they are as a practical matter
remains one of the important open questions in the law of affirmative action.
Yet the dominant role of constitutional standards cannot be disputed.
George A. Rutherglen and John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination:Law and
Theory 448 (Foundation Press 2005).
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them are quite porous, so that the analysis proceeds from
similar premises and produces similar outcomes.
In this part, I explore several examples of the migration of
Title VII doctrine in equal protection analysis and then the
converse trajectory of equal protection analysis into the
interpretation of the statute. However, this doctrinal
intermingling has not been neutral in its impact, but rather has
skewed towards limiting claims of racial discrimination by racial
minorities, constraining the scope of permissible remediation
and rendering race conscious remedial measures more
vulnerable to attack.
A.

Doctrinal Migration From Title VII to Equal Protection: The
Example of Voluntary Affirmative Action

While doctrinally distinctions have been drawn between
statutory and constitutional standards, aspects of Title VII's
framework regarding proof of discrimination have been imported
into the Court's assessment of affirmative action under the
statute and under equal protection. Principally, the proof
structure for demonstrating systemic intentional discrimination
has been adopted as the factual predicate justifying the
employer's adoption of an affirmative action plan under equal
protection: 128 The Court compares the percentage of historically
underrepresented employees in the workforce to the percentage
of those groups available in the relevant labor pool-the pattern
and practice violation articulated under Title VII 129-to evaluate
the constitutionality of affirmative action plans. On the other
hand, the Court has drawn upon but modified the Title VII
pattern and practice test in setting the standard applied in
assessing voluntary race conscious remedial efforts under the
statute: Here the Court has required evidence only of a
"manifest imbalance." 130
Thus, the standards applied to evaluate voluntary
affirmative action plans under Title VII and under equal
protection are formally distinct, but draw upon the same
interpretive structure of the pattern or practice case. In so
128 See Wygant, 476 US at 275-76 (holding a showing of prior discrimination
in the
practices of a school was necessary to allow the school to adopt an affirmative action
plan); Section I.D.2.
129

See Hazelwood School District u United States, 433 US 299, 303-04 (1977).

"s See Section I.D.1 (discussing Weber and Johnson).
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doing, the respective statutory and constitutional standards
enact similar analytic limitations on voluntary race conscious
affirmative action, albeit to different degrees. Moreover, even to
the extent that they differ, the differences have become less
significant over time as the equal protection analysis has
become more prevalent. In the absence of Supreme Court
decisions after Johnson further interpreting Title VII
affirmative action law, the continued viability of the Weber and
Johnson as Title VII precedent has been questioned. This
ambiguity has privileged and made more prominent the equal
protection framework applied to employers'
voluntary
affirmative action efforts. Under equal protection, such plans
require more rigorous justification modeled on the standard
developed in systemic discrimination cases. These doctrinal
transfers served to legitimate and reify more restrictive
interpretations of the statute and the constitution.
In mapping the transference of Title VII standards into
equal protection analysis, I begin by analyzing the Court's
constitutional analysis in Wygant and its incorporation of the
pattern and practice framework. I consider how that framework
sets up barriers to the implementation of voluntary affirmative
action that have been insufficiently considered. I next examine
the Title VII standard for voluntary affirmative action as
articulated by Weber and Johnson, which admittedly is less
stringent than the equal protection standard, but also imposes
some constraints. Not only are Title VII standards applied in
evaluating such plans perceived as more lenient: They have also
become less visible and have exerted less influence on the
consideration of affirmative action.
1.

Wygant incorporates Title VII standards into equal
protection analysis and thereby imposes greater
restrictions on affirmative action.

Wygant applied strict scrutiny review in striking down the
Jackson School Board's decision to follow the modified collective
bargaining agreement that altered the seniority rules in order to
preserve recent gains in racially integrating the teaching
staff.131 Addressing societal discrimination was not a compelling
governmental interest, nor was the disparity between the
.s.Wygant, 476 US at 279-80.
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relative percentages of black teachers and black students
relevant. Instead, the Court called for "a strong basis in
evidence" in support of the employer's conclusion that remedial
action was necessary.132 The requisite proof can be established
by evidence of a statistically significant disparity between the
number of underrepresented employees in the workforce and the
percentage of qualified workers available in the labor pool, 133 the
metric O'Connor endorsed in her concurrence. 134 Thus, Title VII
doctrine regarding liability for discrimination is transposed into
the equal protection analysis.
Wygant's equal protection test, even as interpreted by
O'Connor, imposes nontrivial and arguably unwarranted
limitations on voluntary affirmative action. Even setting aside
the constraints implied in strict scrutiny review, it is not clear
why the standard of proof of a prima facie case of a pattern and
practice violation is imposed here. The presumption seems to be
that the reasoning is self-evident, that the doctrinal features
would and should travel seamlessly.
But not all agree. As one scholar has argued, in evaluating
whether a plaintiff can establish systemic intentional
discrimination-the gravamen of the "pattern and practice"
case-it may be appropriate to require evidence of a statistical
disparity between the percentage of underrepresented
employees in the relevant job category and the number in the
relevant labor market, but it is not clear that this is the correct
inquiry in the context of voluntary affirmative action. 135 If the
statute was designed to incentivize employers' voluntary efforts
to eliminate past and current disparities in employment
opportunities, arguably the doctrinal structure deployed to
evaluate voluntary affirmative action should be consistent with
that statutory purpose. 136 A comparison between the percentage
of qualified underrepresented jobseekers and the percentage of
underrepresented workers may not reveal a statistically
significant difference even though the paucity of qualified
132

Id at 277.

.ss See Hazelwood, 433 US at 307-08.
134 Wygant, 476 US at 284-86 (O'Connor
concurring).
.s.Kenneth R. Davis, Wheel of Fortune: A Critique of the 'Manifest Imbalance"
Requirement for Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Under Title VII, 43 Ga L Rev 993,
1017-1027 (2009) (arguing that the pattern and practice analysis imposes unjustified
restrictions).
1
Id at 1018-21.
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minority applicants may have resulted from pervasive
discrimination within the industry. 1 37 Seen in this light, the
pattern and practice test applied in this context may unduly
limit the exercise of the employers' managerial prerogative to
expand opportunity where it has been most restricted.
Moreover, while the statistical disparity between the
percentage of underrepresented groups in the workforce and the
percentage in the local labor market reasonably counts as a
relevant factor in establishing proof of discrimination, it is not
always an accurate metric and its parameters are not always
easily defined. The labor market for a given position may be
affected by shifts in the local population, or an employer may
draw the workforce from multiple areas, across geographic and
governmental boundaries, making the identification of the labor
market more complex. 138 Employers may recruit workers from
geographic areas that are racially segregated, 139 or the

Johnson interpreted Weber to permit the comparison to the general labor market
where no specialized skills were needed:
1

Such an approach reflected the recognition that the proportion of black craft
workers in the local labor force was likely as miniscule as the proportion in
Kaiser's work force. The [Weber] Court realized that the lack of imbalance
between these figures would mean that employers in precisely those industries
in which discrimination has been most effective would be precluded from
adopting training programs to increase the percentage of qualified minorities.
Johnson, 480 US at 633 n 10.
"s For an example of how contentious and difficult this can be, see Hazelwood, 433
US at 306-08, where the plaintiff class disputed the employer's definition of the
geographical area. See also Wards Cove Packing Co, Inc v Atonio, 490 US 642 (1989),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1074, as
recognized in Raytheon Co v Hernandez, 540 US 44 (2003) (disputing the relevant labor
market where different markets tied to different jobs in the same firm).
19 Thus, for example, if a neighborhood or area has very few black residents-say 2
percent-then an employer's decision to draw a workforce from that geographic area will
have a restrictive effect on the numbers in the workplace. For of evidence of how
residential segregation affects job discrimination, see generally Douglas S. Massey,
Jonathan Rothwell and Thurston Domina, The Changing Bases of Segregation in the
United States, 626 Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 74 (2009) (on residential segregation
generally); George Wilson, Racialized Life-Chance Opportunities Across the Class
Structure: The Case of African Americans, 609 Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 215, 217
(2007) ("This article examines the manner in which spheres of employment and
residence help to explain the racialization of life-chance opportunities at both the
impoverished and the middle-class levels."). The issue is raised in multiple employment
discrimination cases. See, for example, NAACP v North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue,
665 F3d 464, 469 (3d Cir 2011) (residency requirement caused a disparate impact);
NAACP v Town of Harrison,NJ, 940 F2d 792, 812 (3d Cir 1991) (affirming a disparate
impact finding where a residency requirement for municipal employment kept jobs from
minority groups in neighboring communities).
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concentration of one group in certain jobs may be evidence of
discrimination. 140
In sum, the incorporation of Title VII's pattern and practice
analysis into the court's assessment of a government employer's
affirmative action plan has worked to restrict remedial action
designed to address the systemic racial inequality in
employment.
2.

Comparing Weber and Johnson in mapping the
transference between Title VII and equal protection.

Because the Court in Weber was concerned that Title VII
not be used to lock in existing inequality, it borrowed from but
modified the test in pattern and practice cases that calibrated
discrimination by, in part, assessing the statistical disparity
between the composition of the workforce and the relevant labor
market.14 1 Instead of the pure pattern and practice analysis,
Weber looked to whether there was a manifest imbalance in
traditionally segregated job categories-arguably a less
stringent standard.
Yet, beneath this seeming consensus about the import of
Weber, the meaning of the "manifest imbalance" standard is
open to debate, as the Court and individual Justices have
invoked different formulations. The Court in Weber posed the
relevant inquiry as whether there was a conspicuous or manifest
imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories. This
analysis was less specific than contemplated by the pattern and
practice cases that compared the number of underrepresented
workers and the number of qualified underrepresented persons
in the relevant labor market. 142 Arguably, the Court was aware
that the latter comparison might show little or no statistical
disparity, not because there was so little discrimination, but
Workforces comprised overwhelmingly of women or people of color are those in
which workers often receive lower pay, creating what might be described as low wage
ghettos. See, for example, International Union u State of Michigan, 673 F Supp 893, 897
(1987). See generally Tracy E. Higgins, Job Segregation, Gender Blindness, and
Employee Agency, 55 Me L Rev 241 (2003); Barbara H. Wootton, Gender Differences in
OccupationalEmployment, Monthly Labor Rev 15 (1997).
141 Weber, 443 US at 208-09.
142 See, for example, United States u TI. M.E.-D.C.
Inc, 517 F2d 299, 315 (5th Cir
140

1975), vacd by International Brotherhood of Teamsters u United States, 431 US 324
(1977) (comparing the number of black workers in the workforce, the "inexorable zero" in
that case, to the number in the relevant labor market calculated with reference to the
general population).
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rather because discrimination was so pervasive. In that
circumstance, the relevant labor market would be impacted and
indeed shaped by discrimination. A paradigm example is Weber
itself in which there were few eligible black workers available
for the training program because the discriminatory conduct of
the union had denied them an opportunity to acquire the
necessary preliminary qualifications. 14 3
This standard also was less demanding than the "arguable
violation" standard that Justice Blackmun initially favored and
that both Kaiser and the United States had urged. 144 While the
"arguable violation" test is focused on the behavior of the
employer, the traditionally segregated job categories test would
include disparities not directly connected to the employer's
specific
conduct,
and
would
include
any
pre-Act
discrimination. 145
Ultimately,
however,
Blackmun
was
persuaded that the traditionally segregated job categories test
was appropriate as a private employer's affirmative action plan
should be able to go beyond the minimum requirements of the
statute.
Taken together, Weber's deviation from the prima facie
pattern and practice standard and the arguable violation
requirement supports the view that the Title VII standard is
both less stringent than equal protection analysis and is also
less rigorous than the Title VII pattern and practice standard.
On one view, this doctrinal framework does not unduly restrict
efforts to remove entrenched barriers and reasonably balance
competing interests. However, closer analysis of the impact and
trajectory of the "manifest imbalance" standard complicates and
to some degree qualifies that conclusion. The immediate impact
was to set a lower threshold, but the test does not always
capture the ways in which inequality is structured into the
The Court took judicial notice that black workers had been excluded from craft
jobs. Weber, 443 US at 198.
144 Weber, 443 US at 211 (O'Connor concurring). This
"lowering" of the standard of
proof to justify affirmative action has been subject to some critique. See Tack, 26
Willamette L Rev at 975-76 (cited in note 47) (arguing that "[Weber] announced a lower
factual predicate in Title VII cases . . . [that] did not require the employer to discover
that it might be subject to a prima facie or even an arguable Title VII claim before it
embarked on an affirmative action program. . . . [that permitted] a plan based largely on
societal past discrimination against blacks as a group ... [and] sanctioned the use of race
not only as a 'plus' but as the determinative factor in making a particular employment
decision").
141 Weber, 443
US at 198.
143
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workplace nor has it had significant influence on the direction of
equality jurisprudence.
Relying on Weber, the Court in Johnson upheld the
promotion of a female employee over a male applicant pursuant
to a voluntary affirmative action plan. The plan at issue was
justified, like Kaiser's plan in Weber, because it was designed to
correct a "manifest imbalance reflecting the underrepresentation
of women in traditionally segregated job categories."14 6 While
the Court acknowledged that under the pattern and practice
framework, the relevant comparison is between the number of
women in the relevant jobs and the number of available
qualified candidates, it allowed the comparison to the general
population because there were no special requirements for the
feeder positions for the job at issue.14 7 Moreover, because of the
stark disparity between the gender composition of the work force
and general labor pool-no woman had ever held the job-the
Court held that the plan was a valid effort to address a manifest
imbalance.14 8 There was no required showing that the job
categories had been traditionally segregated. Citing the Ninth
Circuit opinion with approval, the Court noted, "A plethora of
proof is hardly necessary to show that women are generally
underrepresented in such positions and that strong social
pressures weigh against their participation."1 4 9 Clearly, this
standard was not equivalent to or as rigorous as the
constitutional standard of strict scrutiny urged by Scalia's
dissent. 15 0 It also differed from and presumably was less precise
than the "statistical disparity sufficient to support a prima facie
claim . . . of a pattern or practice claim of discrimination" urged

by O'Connor in her concurrence. 15 1
Johnson allowed
employers
greater
latitude
in
implementing voluntary affirmative action plans under Title
VII: Employers are not required to prove that the plan was
adopted to remedy past discrimination nor does they have to
show that the imbalance was the consequence of the employers'

146
147
148
149

Johnson,480 US at 617.
Id at 632.
Id at 656.
Id at 634 n 12.

"s Johnson, 480 US at 667 (Scalia dissenting).
...
Id at 649 (O'Connor concurring).
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exclusionary policies. They merely had to demonstrate
"manifest imbalance." 152
3.

a

Reading Title VII and equal protection together.

While formally, private employers do not have to meet the
same evidentiary requirements as those imposed by the Equal
Protection Clause under Wygant, the line between the statutory
and constitutional standards is not so well delineated. Both
Johnson and Weber as interpretations of the statute, and
Wygant, as an interpretation of equal protection, call for
comparison between the percentage of underrepresented groups
in the workforce and in the relevant labor pool. The former Title
VII cases are more generous in terms of defining the labor pool,
but nevertheless, the underlying premise of all three decisions is
that justification rests on proof of statistical disparity of some
kind. To that extent they do not escape the concerns previously
delineated regarding why a statistical disparity between the
utilization in the workforce and the labor market-even one
more broadly defined than under the Hazelwood standard-may
not capture relevant and significant discrimination. 153
Thus, paradoxically, while the statutory standard has been
characterized as less onerous than the constitutional rule, the
former may also impose unnecessary and artificial barriers to
the implementation of affirmative action plans and to achieving
equal opportunity. At least one Justice has expressed the view
that proof of a manifest imbalance or statistical disparity may
be unwarranted. Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Johnson
argued:
I see no reason why the employer has any duty, prior to
granting a preference to a qualified minority employee, to
determine whether his past conduct might constitute an
arguable violation of Title VII. Indeed, in some instances

112 This position has been criticized for being insufficiently
marked and argued.
Mary C. Daly criticizes Johnson for relaxing the standard in this sense, questioning
whether it was appropriate for the Court to "recast the Weber formula in a significantly
different manner without acknowledging the change." Daly, 30 BC L Rev at 26 (cited in
note 114). Other commentators have also argued that relying on the manifest imbalance
standard as articulated in the systemic discrimination context would allow the court to
draw upon existing case law. See Rutherglen and Ortiz, 35 UCLA L Rev at 482 (cited in
note 16).
..
s See Davis, 43 Ga L Rev at 1016-17 (cited in note 135).
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the employer may find it more helpful to focus on the
future. Instead of retroactively scrutinizing his own or
society's possible exclusions of minorities in the past to
determine the outer limits of a valid affirmative action
program-or, indeed, any particular affirmative-action
decision-in many cases the employer will find it more
appropriate to consider other legitimate reasons to give
preferences to members of under-represented groups.1 54
These include preventing racial tension, enhancing
diversity, providing better services to black citizens, or
eliminating a system of racial caste.1 55
Moreover, some formulations of the manifest imbalance
standard incorporate the additional qualifier that this
imbalance is assessed with respect to "traditionally segregated
job categories." 15 6 This seems logical as a descriptive matter in
the context of Weber and Johnson where the categories at issue
had been severely restricted historically, but outside that
context, the addition of the "traditionally segregated jobs" aspect
of the test could be problematic from the standpoint of the
statutory goal. Rather than encouraging employers to exercise
their power over employment procedures to increase the
inclusion of previously excluded groups, the "traditionally
segregated jobs" requirement can easily be read as requiring
that an employer acknowledge its own discrimination before
developing a plan to increase the number of underrepresented
workers. In fact, some lower courts have interpreted this
provision to require proof that the category of jobs had been
impacted by past or present discrimination. 157
Fundamentally, even assuming a meaningful distinction
between the Johnson/Weber "manifest imbalance" standard and
Wygant's test, the latter has exerted greater influence. First, the
equal protection analysis has been more broadly applied. For

example, in City of Richmond v J.A. Croson,15 8 the Court
extended the Wygant analysis from the employment sphere to

114

Johnson, 480 US at 646-47 (Stevens concurring).

155 Id at 647, quoting Sullivan, 100 Harv L Rev at 96 (cited in note 102).
116 See Johnson, 480 US at 620; Weber, 443
US at 197.
117 See, for example, Schurr u Resorts InternationalHotel, Inc, 196 F3d 486, 497-99
(3rd Cir 1999); Lomack u City of Newark, 463 F3d 303, 307 (3d Cir 2006).
"s

488 US 469 (1989).
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government contracts.1 59 It invalidated Richmond's affirmative
action plan to increase minority participation in city government
contracting in part because it found the factual predicate
invoked by the City-the near total lack of contracts awarded to
minority contractors compared to the minority population-to be
inadequate. Relying on Title VII's labor market standards,
O'Connor's opinion challenged the City's targeted goals of 30
percent 6 0 and demanded proof that the percentage of city
contracts awarded to minority contractors was substantially less
than the percentage of qualified minority contractors. This
contrasts with Marshall's dissent which argued that the
standards differed and criticized the majority for conflating Title
VII and equal protection standards and effectively making the
constitutional validity of an affirmative action plan dependent
on a local assessment of whether the conduct constituted
discrimination. 161 O'Connor's analysis in both Wygant and
Croson reflected the importation of Title VII pattern and
practice standards into the equal protection metric and the
ratification of a less deferential stance towards even voluntarily
adopted plans.

19
160

City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co, 488 US 469, 492-94 (1989).
Id at 488.

16' Id at 551-56 (Marshall dissenting). In his view, the Court's holding conflated
Title VII and Equal Protection standards by conditioning locally enacted race conscious
affirmative action plans on evidence of a prima facie case of the locality's constitutional
or statutory violation:
[On the majority's view] [t]he meaning of "equal protection of the laws" thus
turns on the happenstance of whether a state or local body has previously
defined illegal discrimination. Indeed, given that racially discriminatory cities
may be the ones least likely to have tough antidiscrimination laws on their
books, the majority's constitutional incorporation of state and local statutes
has the perverse effect of inhibiting those States or localities with the worst
records of official racism from taking remedial action. Similar flaws would
inhere in the majority's standard even if it incorporated only federal
antidiscrimination statutes. If Congress tomorrow dramatically expanded Title
VII . . . or alternatively, if it repealed that legislation altogether-the meaning
of equal protection would change precipitately along with it. Whatever the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had in mind in 1868, it certainly was
not that the content of their Amendment would turn on the amendments to or
the evolving interpretations of a federal statute passed nearly a century later.
Id at 556. Marshall's contention was that the determination of an equal protection
violation should not rest on whether the conduct was prohibited under local, state or
federal law. His reasoning reflects a sense that Title VII and the equal protection clause
are not necessarily co-extensive in all contexts. This logically follows from the fact that
the statute is more readily and frequently amended, and that the meaning of the
constitution should not be so easily changed.
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Secondly, Weber and Johnson's more generous standard for
justifying voluntary affirmative action has largely been
overshadowed by increasingly stringent proof requirements
articulated in the context of equal protection analysis. In a
certain sense, this is related to the fact that subsequent to
Johnson, no Supreme Court case has evaluated an employer's
voluntary affirmative action plan under the statute. 162 Indeed,
given the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, many
commentators have questioned the continued viability of

Johnson and Weber. 163
Apart from whether the current court would affirm this
precedent, the effect of importing Title VII pattern and practice
standards into the equal protection analysis of voluntary
affirmative action is to narrow the space for permissible race
conscious remediation under the constitution as well as under
the statute without expressly overruling or setting precedent. As
the Court's equal protection analysis has become more
influential and exercised more hydraulic pressure on the
statutory interpretation, the ground for race-sensitive remedial
action has narrowed. 164
B.

From Equal Protection to Title VII: The Return

As previously noted, more stringent doctrinal constraints
have not only emerged in the way that aspects of Title VII
doctrine have been transferred into equal protection analysis:

Roberto L. Corrada, Ricci's Dicta: Signaling a New Standard for Affirmative
Action Under Title V11?, 46 Wake Forest L Rev 241, 241 (2011) ("The standard for
voluntary affirmative action under Title VII has been in question in recent years. The
last United States Supreme Court opinion to directly address the matter is over twenty
years old.").
16s See Sachin S. Pandya, Detecting the Stealth Erosion of Precedent: Affirmative
Action After Ricci, 31 Berkeley J Emp & Labor L 285, 330 (2010) ("[I]n Ricci, the Court
likely wrote the majority opinion in such a way as to erode Weber and Johnson by stealth
to make it easier to later expressly limit the circumstances under which Title VII
permits voluntary affirmative action plans."); Corrada, 46 Wake Forest L Rev at 257
(cited in note 162) (explaining that Weber and Johnson, as precedent for voluntary
affirmative action cases, are "dated and likely do not reflect the current thinking of the
Court in these matters"); Tracy E. Higgins and Laura A. Rosenbury, Agency, Equality,
and Antidiscrimination Law, 85 Cornell L Rev 1194, 1214 (2000) (stating in regards to
the Weber and Johnson standards that "notwithstanding the clear language in Johnson,
lower courts have increasingly collapsed the two standards, effectively limiting the scope
of voluntary affirmative action by private employers under Title VII").
164 See generally ParentsInvolved in Community Schools v Seattle School District
No 1, 551 US 701 (2007); Pena, 515 US 200 (1995).
162
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The return of equal protection analysis into Title VII has
similarly constricted the space for racial minorities to secure
relief from exclusionary employment practices. This section
considers this trajectory in the context of disparate impact,
disparate treatment and affirmative action plans.
1.

Disparate impact: Ricci.

As previously noted, in Ricci the Court struck down the
City's decision to cancel its testing and scoring procedures
because they operated to disproportionately exclude black and
Latino applicants for promotion in the City's fire department. 165
While the City asserted that it acted to avoid creating disparate
racial impact by using exclusionary criteria that had not been
validated to job performance, the Court held that the City had
not established the requisite factual predicate. 166 What the City
characterized as a race neutral decision-cancelling the results
and scores for everyone, the majority asserted was an action
driven by the "raw racial results." 167 On this view the two proof
structures of Title VII-disparate impact and intentional
disparate treatment-were presumably in conflict as the effort
to avoid the former produced liability for the latter. 168 The City's
action could not be based on the good faith belief that it would
be liable for disparate impact: What was required was "a strong
basis in evidence"-a standard transplanted from equal
protection analysis of affirmative action. 169 In part this reflected
the Court's conflation of disparate impact with affirmative
action.170 The Court rejected the more lenient standard of good
faith belief proposed by New Haven, because it created the risk
of incentivizing a "de facto quota" system. 171
While the Court could have drawn on the Johnson/Weber
Title VII standard of "conspicuous imbalance" in the context of a

16
66
167
168

Ricci, 557 US at 579.
Id at 592.
Id at 593.
Id.

169

Ricci, 557 US at 593.

170

Cheryl

I. Harris

and Kimberly West-Faulcon,

Reading Ricci: Whitening

Discrimination,Racing Test Fairness,58 UCLA L Rev 73, 113-18 (2010).
17
Ricci, 557 US at 581. But this question was purportedly settled by the postWatson statutory amendments enacted in 1991 that reaffirmed and overruled the
Court's interpretation of disparate impact.
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Title VII challenge, instead it looked to the equal protection
standard of a strong basis in evidence to interpret the statute.
According to the majority, the strong basis in evidence standard
was necessary to resolve the tension between Title VII's
disparate impact and disparate treatment provisions. 172 The
issue of whether the Title VII and equal protection standards
are the same was not resolved: potentially the constitutional
standard might require something more or different than a
strong basis in evidence of disparate impact.
2.

Disparate treatment.

Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v
Hopkins 173 was predicated at least in part on a distinction
between what the statute and equal protection required.1 74 In
that case Ann Hopkins claimed that her employer's refusal to
promote her to partner in a leading accounting firm was sex
discrimination prohibited by Title VII because the employer's
decision was motivated by the perception that she was
insufficiently feminine.1 75 Despite the fact that she excelled at
her job, the negative partnership vote included comments that
she needed to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear makeup, have her hair styled, [ ]
wear jewelry" and attend charm school. 176 In evaluating
Hopkins' charge, O'Connor argued that once evidence was
adduced that gender stereotyping played a role in the decision,
the burden shifted to the employer to show that the same
decision would have been made if based solely on
nondiscriminatory considerations. 177 She further asserted that
under Title VII this burden shifting was justified in comparison
to equal protection analysis where the burden shifts to the State
to show "permissibly race-neutral criteria." 178 Notably, while
asserting that the standards differ, there seems to be
considerable overlap between them.

Ricci, 557 US at 558.
17s 490 US 228 (1989).
174 Price Waterhouse u Hopkins, 490 US
228, 261-62 (1989).
171 Id at
261.
176 Id at
235.
172

177

17s

Id.
Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 269.
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Court ordered affirmative action.

statutory
and the
the
This continuity between
constitutional standards is particularly evident in the context of
court ordered race conscious remediation. In evaluating
judicially imposed affirmative action plans imposed on private
and public employers, it has expressly considered whether these
measures are valid under Title VII. Moreover, because the
remedies are imposed by a court, state action is said to be
present and so the Court has also considered whether these
orders violate equal protection guarantees. In that sense, these
cases foreground constitutional questions that remained
submerged in cases involving voluntary affirmative action plans
adopted by public employers.1 79 Here the court has not expressly
declared that the standards for private or public employers are
different, nor has it ruled that they are the same. Instead,
disclaiming the adoption of a specific constitutional test, the
Court has upheld these judicially imposed remedial measures
under strict scrutiny or strict scrutiny-like standards.
Effectively, the Court has treated the validity of court ordered
race conscious remediation under the statute and under the
constitution as analytically separate questions but invoked the
framework of strict scrutiny analysis under both. As the
decisions in these cases are fractured, involving multiple
concurring and dissenting opinions, there is little clear
consensus, but at the same time, the gravitational pull towards
strict scrutiny as the dominant analysis seems evident. Both

Sheet Metal Workers v EEOC180 and Paradise are leading
examples.
In Sheet Metal Workers, the Court considered a judicially
ordered race-conscious affirmative action plan to remedy a
protracted pattern of discriminatory conduct by the union in
violation of Title VII. 181 In opposition, the union argued that the
remedial plan, which set a goal of 29 percent non-white
179

Johnson demonstrates the case in which a public employer's plan was examined

under the statute but not under the constitution. Johnson, 480 US at 648.
1s0 Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers'InternationalAssociation v EEOC, 478 US 421
(1986).
181The pattern of discrimination was flagrant and the union had been openly defiant
as well as creative in manipulating its practices to avoid compliance. Id at 427-32. The
remedial measures also included contempt citations, etc. Here I consider the Court's
opinion with respect to the affirmative action plan only as that most specifically deals
with the question of permissible uses of race.
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membership, violated Title VII and constituted a denial of equal
protection.182 The Court rejected the union's claim and upheld
the plan both under Title VII and constitutional standards. Title
VII's provision that an employer is not required to adopt a quota
or preference because of a racial imbalance in the workforce did
not deprive the Court of authority to order this remedial
measure. 183 Moreover, Title VII's section 706(g) which granted
the trial courts broad discretion to order equitable relief, but
prohibited an order requiring a union to admit a member for any
reason other than discrimination, was interpreted not to limit
judicially imposed remedies to those that benefitted only the
actual victims of discrimination. 184 The statute allows a court to
order "affirmative race-conscious relief as a remedy for past
discrimination," particularly in circumstances of flagrant and
egregious violations.18 5 Under Title VII, then, these remedial
measures were necessary to address the discriminatory conduct,
were applied in a flexible way, were temporary, and did not
"unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees."1 86
With respect to the equal protection question, the plurality
declined to adopt any particular standard from among various
formulations for judging the constitutionality of the raceconscious affirmative remedies. 187 However, the Court held that
Id at 479-80. In this instance it was the equal protection guarantee that is part
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
1ss Id at 464. Section 703(j) provides:
182

Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any
individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, referred or
classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization,
admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to,
or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison
with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the
available work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
42 USC
184

§ 2000e-2(j).
Sheet Metal Workers, 478 US at 447; 42 USC

§ 2000e-5(g).

Sheet Metal Workers, 478 US at 476.
186 Id at 476-79.
187 Id at 478; Wygant, 476 US at 274 (noting that means chosen
must be "narrowly
tailored" to achieve "compelling government interest"); Wygant, 476 US at 313 (Stevens
dissenting) (explaining that the public interest served by racial classifications and the
1ss
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the evidence demonstrating the union's long standing and
egregious discriminatory conduct established a compelling
governmental interest.188 In addition, the measures were
narrowly tailored because they were necessary to end the
violations, were temporary and had only "a marginal impact on
the interests of white workers."18 9 While not deciding that strict
scrutiny applied, the Court ruled that in effect the program had
met the most stringent standard of review-strict scrutiny-and
thus was constitutional.
Notably, even though the Court did not expressly state that
the standards under the statute and the constitution were the
same and analytically bifurcated the analysis, the standards as
applied are minimally, if at all, different. In this context, the
distinctions between "egregious discrimination" as the predicate
under Title VII, and the compelling governmental interest in
remedying past and present discrimination under equal
protection seem difficult to discern.
There were concurring and dissenting views. On the
constitutional issue, Powell's concurrence also invoked the
language of strict scrutiny to find that where an organization
has engaged in an extensive pattern of egregious discriminatory
conduct, race targeted remedial goals could be justified. 19 0
Powell reasoned that without the authority to set a benchmark
against which to measure the union's progress, the district court
would have been unable to craft an effective remedy. 191 Echoing
strict scrutiny analysis, Powell's evaluation of the district court's
order identified several factors relevant to the determination
that the plan was narrowly drawn and echoed strict scrutiny
analysis: the efficacy of alternative remedies, the temporary
nature of the plan, the availability of waivers, and the disparity

means pursued must justify adverse effects on the disadvantaged group); Fullilove U
Klutznick, 448 US 448, 491 (1980) (explaining that racial preferences are subject to "a
most searching examination"); Fullilove, 448 US at 519 (Marshall concurring) (noting
that remedial use of race must be substantially related to achievement of important
governmental objectives); Regents of the University of California v Bakke, 438 US 265,
305 (1978) (explaining that racial classification must be necessary to accomplishment of
substantial state interest); Bakke, 438 US at 359 (Brennan concurring) (explaining that
the remedial use of race must be substantially related to achievement of important
governmental objectives).
188 Sheet Metal, 478 US at 480-81.
189 Id at 481.
190 Id at 485.
191 Id at 486-87.
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between the number of minority workers employed and the
number of available minority members in the relevant
population. 192 Notably, while the plan imposed some potential
delay to white troopers seeking promotion, the burden was
sufficiently diffuse to be permissible. 193 O'Connor, concurring in
part and dissenting in part, rejected the Court's judgment with
regard to the membership goals and the fund, finding them to
effectively impose a racial quota requiring the kind of racial
balancing prohibited by the statute. 194
In Paradise, as in Sheet Metal Workers, the district court
found a pattern of egregious discrimination: 19 5 The Alabama
Department of Public Safety "had systematically excluded
Blacks from employment as state troopers in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 196 When a hiring quota and consent
decrees altering the department's hiring and promotion
practices proved ineffective, the judge ordered that if the
Department had not developed a promotion rank, at least 50
percent of those promoted to upper ranks must be black, if
qualified black candidates were available. 197 The Government
challenged this order as a violation of equal protection.
The plurality in Paradise noted that while there was no
consensus regarding the appropriate constitutional standard,
the order was valid because it would survive even strict scrutiny
analysis: Remedying egregious discrimination established a
compelling governmental interest and the plan was necessary in
the absence of viable alternatives. 198 The Court was also
persuaded that the order was narrowly tailored because the plan
was flexible, allowed for waivers, was temporary and did not
impose "an unacceptable burden on innocent third parties." 199
The opinion did not consider whether the order violated Title VII
as that question was not presented. It relied on Sheet Metal and
invoked the standards it deployed to evaluate the remedial
orders in that case: "the necessity for the relief and the efficacy

192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199

Sheet Metal, 478 US at 486.
Id at 488.
Id at 489.
Paradise,480 US at 165-66.
Id at 170.
Id at 149-50.
Id at 166, 171-72.
Paradise,480 US at 178-82.
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of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of the relief,
including the availability of waiver provisions; the relationship
of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the
impact of the relief on the rights of third parties." 200
Justice Powell's concurrence noted the similarity between
Paradise and Sheet Metal Workers in that both cases involved a
protracted history of egregious discrimination. He also pointed
out the difference in that Sheet Metal Workers was analyzed
under the provisions of Title VII, Paradisewas analyzed under
the Equal Protection Clause. 20 1 In a footnote, Justice Powell
stated that the statutory and constitutional standards were
similar, but not identical. 202 Like the plurality opinion, Justice
Powell articulated the constitutional test in terms very similar
to the standard in Sheet Metal Workers: The constitutionality of
judicial orders on either a public and or private employer
required proof of a "compelling governmental interest" and
narrow tailoring requirements. This effectively circumscribed
judicial efforts to address even egregious forms of employment
discrimination.
Strict scrutiny frames affirmative action as an exceptional,
extraordinary departure from a race neutral baseline. But in the
context of Sheet Metal and Paradise,this framework obscures
decades of documented resistance-from the subtle to the
flagrant to court-ordered relief for entrenched racial
discrimination. Nor was this an unfamiliar pattern in a number
of industries and unions, as numerous reported cases attest. 2 03
Id at 171.
Id at 186.
202 Id at 186 n 1. See also note 125 and
accompanying text.
203
See generally EEOC u Guardian Pools, Inc, 828 F2d 1507 (11th Cir 1987)
(regarding a class action lawsuit based on gender discrimination resulted in district
court ordered affirmative action including an order to actively recruit women in order to
decrease the male to female ratio. Defendant failed to perform the court's orders and was
subsequently found to be in contempt of court); Morrow u Crisler, 491 F2d 1053 (5th Cir
1974) (noting that nearly two years after the district court's affirmative action order, the
defendant Mississippi Highway Patrol had hired a severely low number of AfricanAmerican employees: Only six of the ninety-one patrolmen hired in those two years.);
200

201

United States u Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers International Union, Local Union No 46,
471 F2d 408 (2d Cir 1973) (noting that the United States had brought suit against the
defendant union for employment discrimination based on race and entered into a consent
decree ordered by the court enjoining them from further discrimination and to take
affirmative action measures, particularly in the area of permit granting to minority nonunion members. Defendant was to submit a plan within six months of the decree. At the
end of the six months, defendants submitted a plan which the administrator found to be
"trivial," "superficial," and "useless." At that same time, defendant abolished its permit
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While arguments for congruence have certainly had traction, the
justification for imposing stringent limits on the remedial
authority of the judiciary in the form of strict scrutiny in this
context seems less than persuasive.
The transference from Title VII to equal protection and the
return of equal protection analysis to Title VII demonstrates
how the doctrinal boundaries have blurred. At one level,
transplanting statutory standards into constitutional analysis
and constitutional standards into the statutory analysis
comports with a certain logic in that both Title VII and equal
protection are measures crafted to address inequality and
should be symmetrical. Indeed, the Court at times proceeds from
the premise that the justification for these transfers is selfevident. Yet, the overall pattern of these shifts has not been
neutral: rather, they have tended to impose greater constraints
on remedial measures to address racial inequality.
IV. CONCLUSION

The fact that consideration of the relationship between Title
VII and equal protection has produced claims of both divergence
and convergence in law and legal scholarship is not wholly
unexpected given the fractious nature of both the politics of race
and the law of racial reform. In one sense, the debate over the
statutory and constitutional standards defining discrimination
and the permissible scope of race sensitive remediation reflects
disputes over doctrine that are grounded in the shifting racial
politics that were constituted through and brought into law. The
point is not simply that the divisions among the justices mirror
the political divisions within the country regarding racial
reform; rather, it is that the law also is a site where racial
ideology is constituted, divisions are constructed, and claims are

program completely, resulting in a court ordered granting of 100 permits to minority
workers.); EEOC v Local 580, International Association of Bridge, Structural and
Ornamental Ironworkers, 669 F Supp 606 (SDNY 1987) (discussing defendant union's
discriminatory practices based on race and national origin prompted the United States to
file suit against them in 1971, resulting in a subsequent consent agreement in 1978
enjoining the union from discriminating and ordering performance of affirmative action
measures to increase minority representation. The union failed to perform several
provisions and the court held it in contempt of court for failing to comply with the court
ordered consent agreement. This same union was subsequently sued for failure to
comply with Title VII several times up to as recent as 2011).
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legitimated. 204 This is particularly so when the law is both a
focus of racial reform and a target of racial retrenchment.
At a more focused and functional level of analysis, it
appears that whether the arguments for convergence or
divergence ultimately control in any given case or set of cases,
the law is both unstable and asymmetric in its relationship to
claims made by racial minorities. Ultimately, convergence and
divergence function as a kind of technology or analytic technique
through which more stringent requirements are imposed on
efforts to remedy racial disparities and inequality.

204 Race and law are mutually constitutive. This is one of Critical
Race Theory's
central insights and stands in contrast to the view that sees law as primarily a reflective
of some politics outside. Crenshaw, 101 Harv L Rev at xxv (cited in note 14).

